Nov 29, I can’t help but leaving my reading of Frank Jackson’s Epiphenomenal Qualia with a sense of wonder and a grinning awe. This, independent of. Sep 3, Frank Jackson () formulates the intuition underlying his that knowledge about qualia is impossible if qualia are epiphenomenal and he. Oct 2, Jackson quotes are from “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Jackson describes himself as “a qualia freak”. The word “qualia” is the plural of the word.

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V1 The weaker version of the knowledge argument: Wualia, we can imagine a possible world that is, logically possible with beings who are physically just like us except that they lack consciousness viz. In particular, it does not entitle us to infer that these experiences are not physical events. Gertler uses ffank disparity to oppose Conee’s account: A cannot know that B has an experience of a particular quality Q on certain occasions.

Remarks About the History epihenomenal the Underlying Frqnk 2. Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience”. So the epiphenomenal stuff was just very hard to believe. In other words, Jackson’s Mary is a scientist who knows everything there is to know about the science of color, but has never experienced color.

They claim that despite this defect she would know what it is like to have an experience of e. The jaxkson that he could predict on this subject would be that certain changes would take place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. Positions that clearly fall into that category are defended in HorganChurchland ; Tye; Bigelow and Pargetter ; Loar ; Lycan; Pereboom ; Perry ; Van Gulick ; Byrne ; Levin ; Balog forthcoming ; Papineau What you have to ask yourself is, when something looks red, how am I representing the world to be?

As these examples suggest, the idea that complete physical knowledge isn’t sufficient for complete knowledge of phenomenal states has been around for a while. She argues that the property dualist can explain why the most direct way to get familiar with a quale is by having an experience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does not have any explanation for this particular jacksoh of qualia.


He now resolutely rejects dualism. As long as two qualia names Q and R refer to the same quale, replacing Q by R in an ascription of phenomenal belief cannot change the truth value of the belief ascription.


Chalmers considers responses along the lines of the “ability hypothesis” objection described above to be the most promising objections, but unsuccessful: The Modal argument works like this:. White argues against Loar that the account cannot explain the a posteriori character of mind-brain identity statements in a satisfying manner.

In Conee’s account, one can come to know be acquainted with a phenomenal quality only by experiencing it, but not by knowing facts about it as Mary did.

Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case of Mary, but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article: I was taught by Michael Bradley, and he had some good arguments for dualism. The acceptability of its second premise P2 Mary lacks factual knowledge before release and of the inferences from P1 Mary has complete physical knowledge before release to C1 Mary knows all the physical facts and from P2 to C2 Mary does not know some facts before release depend on quite technical and controversial issues about a the appropriate theory of property concepts and their relation to the properties they express and b the appropriate theory of belief content.

In a similar argument, philosopher Philip Pettit likens the case of Mary to patients suffering from akinetopsiathe inability to perceive the motion of objects. For she, unlike us, can describe the nomic relations between S k and other states of chromatic vision This is different from other physical objects of knowledge: These authors accept the first premise of both versions of the argument and the second premise of the first version as well, but they deny the second premise of the second version and insist that 2a does not imply 2b.


Only at t 3 does she acquire the kind of knowledge that the knowledge argument is concerned with knowledge that involves the application of phenomenal concepts about experiences of other people.

Qualia: The Knowledge Argument

She could not have had a demonstrative belief of this kind before release. Arguments of that kind are found in Lockwoodchap.

Nagel’s is different than Jackson’s argument 1. If she already had it then you have to answer the question, what property do her newer experiences represent things as having which she knew about in the epiphenkmenal

Jackson doesn’t see how Nagel’s argument tells against physicalism, since physicalism in no way entails that we should be able to imagine what it’s like to be a bat, nor should it b. There are some facts about human color vision that Mary does not know before frannk release. Frank Jackson Australian National University.

Knowledge argument – Wikipedia

Jackson believed in the explanatory completeness of physiologythat all behaviour is caused by physical forces of some kind. The example of knowledge peiphenomenal oneself de se knowledge may illustrate the general point.

If John finally learns that he is in Amsterdam, he does not thereby learn a new fact—or so many philosophers would insist—he gains new knowledge of a fact that he already knew in a different way.

Reprinted in Lycan She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes Marianna is therefore unable to relate the kinds of color experiences she now is acquainted with to what she already knew about them at t 1.

He proposes a representationalist account of phenomenal character. But Jackson changed his mind.