Procedures of DoD R, “Procedures Governing the Activities Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive Key Orders, Directives, and Regulations. • Executive Order • DoD Directive • DoD R. • Supplemented by. DTM Directive , and rep1aces the November 30, version of DoD -R. It is app1icab1e to a11 DoD inte11igence components.
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Disposition of informa- tion about United States persons retained in the files of DoD intelligence components will comply with the disposition schedules approved by the Archivist of the United States for the files or records in which the in- formation is retained.
A corpora- tion or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorpo- rated in the United States, is not a United States person. Inadvertent interception of US dirwctive conver- sation s.
In addition, agencies within the Intelligence Community may disseminate information, other than information derived from signals intelligence, to each appropriate agency within the Intelligence Community, for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it. The report dkd contain an explanation of the nature of the emergency situation. Informa- tion 5240.1-t be collected about a United States person who consents to such collection.
ADA : Counterintelligence and Operations Security Support Program for the DODD
A record of the types of com- 52401.-r and information subject to acquisition by the illegal electronic surveillance equipment may be retained. For purposes of signals intelligence activities only, the following guidelines will apply in determining whether a person is a United States person: Searches of active duty military personnel for counterintelligence purposes. Concealed monitoring in the LJnited States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes where the subject of such monitoring whether or not a US person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes shall be treated as “electronic surveillance within the United States” under Part 1 of Procedure 5, and processed pursuant to that procedure.
Requests will include the information required by section C of part 2 of procedure 5; they will be submitted as soon in the planning stage directife possible. Con- sent may be implied if adequate diective is provided firective a particular action such as entering a building carries with it the presumption of consent to an accompanying action such as search of briefcases. Requests submitted by an Army intelligence component under sections C.
No transmission may be acquired aurally. Authority to employ such techniques shall be limited to that 2540.1-r to perform functions assigned the DoD intelligence com- ponent concerned. Nonconsen- directuve surveys may be conducted to determine the po- tential vulnerability to intelligence services of a foreign power of transmission facilities of communications com- mon carriers, other private commercial entities, and entities of the federal government, subject to the fol- lowing limitations: These in- clude government agencies, law enforcement authori- ties, credit agencies, academic institutions, employers, and foreign governments 3.
The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments are authorized to conduct unconsented physical searches in the United States for counterintelligence purposes of the person or property of active duty military personnel, when au- thorized by a military judge, or a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law en- forcement purposes pursuant to rule d of the Man- ual for Courts Martial, Executive Order refer- ence hbased upon a finding of probable cause to believe such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers.
5240.1-d for mail covers pursuant to this sec- tion may be approved by 524.01-r same authorities and pro- cedures described in section C.
For example, there are ordinarily rea- sonable expectations of privacy in work spaces if a per- son’s actions and papers are not subject to ready observation by others under normal working condi- tions.
Approvals will be granted only after coordination with the approving authority’s supporting judge advocate. To the extent feasible, such information shall be collected from publicly available dpd or with the consent of the person concerned; b.
All requests will receive 5240.-1r legal review by the supporting judge advocate. Conduct of vulnerability surveys. The content of any communication shall: Potential sources of assist- ance to intelligence activities 6.
The function will be identified. Date or dates of the interception.
department of defense (dod) directive r – Luxist – Content Results
Within the United States, a DoD intelligence component may conduct concealed monitoring only on an installation or facility owned or leased by DoD, or AR 1 July otherwise in the course of an investigation conducted pursuant to the Agreement Between the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, reference g. Such employee may already be a member of the organization or may be asked to join. This procedure applies to concealed monitoring only tor foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes conducted by a DoD intelligence component within the United States or directed against a United States person who is outside the United States where the subject of such monitoring does not have a reason- able expectation of privacy, as explained in section B.
The counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments may conduct un- consented physical searches of the person or property of active duty military personnel outside the United States for counterintelligence purposes when author- ized by a military judge, or a military commander em- powered to approve physical searches for law enforce- ment purposes pursuant to rule d of the Manual for Courts Martial, Executive Orderreference hbased upon a finding of probable cause to believe such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers.
Communications security— Promptly after screening of electronic surveillance information sec E. Participation is solely for personal purposesif undertaken at the initiative and expense of the em- ployee for the employee’s benefit.